Subrogation or Equity: An Examination of Subrogation Clauses in
ERISA Qualified Health Plans by Dahl, Peter Joseph
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2013
Subrogation or Equity: An Examination of
Subrogation Clauses in ERISA Qualified Health
Plans
Peter Joseph Dahl
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Dahl, Peter Joseph, "Subrogation or Equity: An Examination of Subrogation Clauses in ERISA Qualified Health Plans" (2013). Law
School Student Scholarship. 336.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/336
Peter Dahl 
Note Draft 2 
Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law (2012) 
Subrogation or Equity: An Examination of Subrogation Clauses in 
ERISA Qualified Health Plans 
I. Introduction 
Lawsuits related to sports injuries are becoming increasingly common at both the 
professional and amateur level. Current and former players are suing both the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the National Football League (NFL) for injuries 
related to concussions. 1 Sports-related lawsuits are also very common at the non-professional 
level and high schools across the country are facing suits by students for permanent sports 
related injuries.2 What these players may not be aware of, however, is that their health insurance 
contracts almost certainly contain a subrogation clause that entitles their health plan's 
administrator to recover any monies received as a result of a successful tort judgment or 
settlement to reimburse the health plan for any money paid in treating the player for the injury. 
Black's Law Dictionary defmes subrogation as "the substitution of one thing for another, or 
of one person into the place of another with respect to rights, claims, or securities. "3 The health 
plan can assert this right of subrogation even after the beneficiary has undertaken the cost of 
pursuing the lawsuit against the tortfeasor. The rights of the health plan often extend so far as to 
1 Mary Pilon, Former Soccer Player Joins Lawsuit Against NC.A.A., THE NEW YORK TIMES COLLEGE 
SPORTS BLOG, (Sept. 24, 2012). http://thequad.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/former-soccer-player-
joins-lawsuit-against-the-n-c-a-ai.;Michael Clinton, Former Jaguars Sue NFL Over Concussions, THE 
JACKSONVILLE BUSINESS JOURNAL {Sept. 21, 2012 1: 13 PM), 
http://www.bizjoumals.com/jacksonville/news/2012/09/21/multiple-former-jaguars-sue-nfl-over.html. 
2 Tom Dowd, Concussion Care a Heavy Burden for Staten Island High School Coaches, (Sept. 20,2012, 
8:00AM), . 
http://www.silive.com/sports/advance/dowd/index.ssf/2012/09/tom dowd concussion care a hea.html. 
3BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 {9th ed. 2009). - - - --
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allow the plan administrator to sue the insured individual to recover any money the plan spent on 
medical treatment following the injury from a tort judgment or settlement. 4 Often the subrogation 
clause does not allow for any deduction for premiums paid to the health plan, attorney fees or 
costs of the suit.5 Essentially, the plan will be reimbursed in full if there is a recovery even 
though the plan did not contribute to the recovery in any way. In many situations, this leaves the 
injured party with no recovery for his injuries after paying the costs of the suit and attorney fees. 
Furthermore, in some situations, the plan administrator can recover from the tort judgment or 
settlement from the portion of the award for pain and suffering or emotional distress. 6 
Many states have recognized the inequity of subrogation that leaves an injured party without 
recovery and have either eliminated the right to subrogation or have limited its scope. 7 However, 
because many of these health plans are ERISA-qualified they are governed by federallaw. 8 The 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a federal statute that governs all actions 
related to a health insurance contract that is provided by an employer.9 When a plan 
administrator wants to sue to recover money from a tort judgment or settlement, he will use 
ERISA to get around the state's anti-subrogation law and either bring the action in federal court 
or apply federal ERISA law in state court. 
Most plaintiffs cannot avoid ERISA preemption unless they provide their own insurance. In 
the case of a professional athlete, more likely than not, his employer, such as the NFL or 
individual sports team, will provide his health insurance as part of a group plan. This plan will 
4 See Roger Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora's Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV. 237 [insert date] 
5 /d. 
6 Mein v. Pool Co. Disabled Intern. Employee Long Term Disability Ben. Plan, 989 F. Supp. 1337 (D. 
Colo. 1998); Davis v. John Alden Life Ins. Co. 746 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Kan. 1990). 
7 Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (N.J. 2001); Valora v. Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund, 
595 Pa. 574 (Pa. 2007). 
8 US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 676 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 36 (2012). 
9 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012). 
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almost certainly contain a subrogation clause. Therefore, his health plan is ERISA preempted 
and state law does not control the plans right to subrogation. In the case of a nonprofessional 
student athlete, often his health insurance is provided by his parents who it turn receive health 
benefits from their employer. 10 Since most health plans in the United States are provided by an 
employer, 11 ERISA preemption is an inescapable dilemma facing many potential plaintiffs. 
The law in this area may be undergoing a change following the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen. 12 The McCutchen 
court held that "appropriate equitable relief' under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA required that the 
plan administrator receive something less than total relief and that injured beneficiaries are 
entitled to assert equitable principals, such as unjust enrichment against the plan administrator 
who did not contribute to the tort settlement.13 The Third Circuit's reasoning was adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in CGI Technologies and Solutions Inc. v. Rose. 14 The 
McCutchen case has received certiorari from the Supreme Court and hopefully will help resolve 
the numerous circuit splits that exist on this issue.15 
This article will argue that ERISA is subject to equitable principals such as unjust enrichment 
and other equitable defenses and that plan administrators should not be unjustly enriched by 
rights to reimbursement without any contribution to recovery or at the very least without any 
10 Primax Recoveries Inc. v. Goss, 240 F. Supp. 2d 800, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
11 Elise Gould, A Decade of Declines in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage, ECONOMIC 
POLICY INSTITUTE, (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp337-employer-sponsored-health-
insurance/. 
12 McCutchen, 663 F.3d at, 676 cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 36 (2012). [Note: I see that for the rest of your 
paper you refer to the 3d Circuit McCutchen decision and the 2012 Supreme Court case. You might want 
to consider differentiating between the two. i.e. "McCutchen f' and "If' - see the Blue Book on these 
rules first though. For now I am just going to convert the following citations of McCutchen to short cites 
for your reference going forward.] 
13 Id. 
14 CGI Technologies & Solutions Inc. v. Rose, 683 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012). 
15 McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 36. 
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reduction for premiums paid into the plan. Part II of this article will give an overview of the law 
on subrogation in the various circuits as well as Supreme Court precedent and state law. Part III 
will examine Congressional intent in passing ERISA and how this intent supports limiting 
subrogation rights. Part IV will examine the US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen case as well as its 
reasoning and holding and the impact this decision will have if it is upheld or reversed. Part V 
will go over criticisms of the McCutchen decision as outlined by other courts and will offer 
several responses. Part VI will offer this article's conclusion. 
II. Overview of the Law 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(b)(3) provides that a civil action may be brought: "by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the 
plan."16 Plan administrators have relied on this section of ERISA to enforce subrogation 
agreements in the federal courts. 
Even if a plan is not preempted by ERISA , some states will enforce subrogation clauses. 
State and federal law is equally varying on the issue of subrogation. States have developed a 
wide variety of approaches in handling subrogation claims in the tort field. 17 Some states have 
preserved common law rules and eliminated subrogation. 18 Some of the states following this 
approach include New Jersey, Arizona, and Missouri. 19 Furthermore, numerous other alternatives 
16 29 U.S.C. § 1132(b)(3). 
17 Johnny C. Parker, The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the Mystery of 
Insurance Subrogation, 70 Mo. L. REv. 723, 737 (2005)_(providing a separate analysis for each state's 
approach). 
18 See Baron, supra note 4. 
19 See id. 
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have been adopted by the states that either limit subrogation or eliminate it altogether in specific 
circumstances.20 These anti-subrogation principles have been adopted by the courts and state 
legislatures alike.21 In addition to these judicially and legislatively created defenses to 
subrogation, some states maintain the common law defenses of the make whole doctrine22, pro 
rata loss sharing23, equitable apportionment and the common fund doctrine. 24 Some of these 
defenses will be discussed further below. 
State and federal law has recognized several defenses to the plan administrator's subrogation 
rights as they exist in equity. First, the specific-fund doctrine. In Sereboffv. Mid Atl. Med. 
Services, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court held that an ERISA carrier is able to enforce its plan's third-
party recovery provision under federal law as long as the plan "specifically identifie[s] a 
particular fund, distinct from [the plan beneficiaries'] general assets [namely, the settlement 
proceeds themselves] ... and a particular share of that fund to which [the plan] was entitled 
[meaning up to the amount the plan paid for injury-related care. ]"26 This language is critical to 
all ERISA plans, and it will make or break an ERISA lien right from the start.27 
The second defense is the make-whole doctrine. This doctrine is a common law rule that 
limits an insurer's right to subrogation. The Fourth Circuit has explained it this way: 
Generally, under the doctrine, an insurer is entitled to subrogation of an insured's 
recovery against a third party only to the extent that the combination of the 
proceeds the insurer has already paid to the insured and the insured's recovery 
from the third party exceed the insured's actual damages. In other words, the 
20 See id. at 240 (discussing Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Kansas). 
21 !d. 
22 Parker, supra note 17 at 737 (providing a separate analysis for each state's approach). 
23 !d. 
24 See Baron supra note 4. (providing a separate analysis for each state's approach). 
25 Sereboffv. Mid Atl. Med. Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 359 (2006). 
26 /d. at 363. 
27 !d. 
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insured must be made whole before the insurer can exercise his right 
of subrogation. 28 
There currently exists a circuit split as to whether the make-whole doctrine should be 
applied as the default rule in ERISA subrogation. The Fourth Circuit recently rejected the 
doctrine as the default rule, reasoning that "such a rule would frustrate the purposes of ERISA by 
requiring plan drafters to inject legalese into plans rather than use clear, ordinary language 
explaining the plan's provisions. "29 Other circuits taking a similar position include the First, 
Third, and Eighth. 30 
The third defense is the "common-fund" or "common benefit" doctrine. This doctrine 
demands that the plan administrator contribute to attorney fees. 31 According to the Seventh 
Circuit, the underlying theory is that to "allow [the insurer] to obtain full benefit from the 
plaintiffs efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich [it] 
unjustly at the plaintiffs expense."32 Reductions for attorney fees are virtually routine with 
respect to other liens, which is why many attorneys expect the same of ERISA liens. However, 
the majority of federal circuits have ruled that an ERISA plan need not contribute to attorney 
fees where its own plain language gives it an unqualified right to reimbursement. 33 
These equitable defenses, adopted by some of the circuits and rejected by others, show 
the nature and severity of the split on this issue. Depending on a plaintiffs location he may be 
entitled to assert several defenses in equity or none at all against a plan administrator seeking 
28 In re Paris, 211 F.3d 1265 (4th Cir. 2000). 
29 ld. 
30Admin. Comm. ofWal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates' Health & Welfare Plan v. Gamboa, 479 F.3d 538 
(8th Cir. 2007); Qualchoice, Inc. v. Williams, 14 F. App'x 417 (6th Cir. 2001). 
31 Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 1997). 
32 Citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 6 (1943). 
33 See Kress v. Food Employers Labor Relations Assn., 291 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 2004); Harris, 208 
F.3d at 279; Walker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 159 F.3d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1998); Ryan v. Federal Express 
Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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reimbursement. Take for example the situation of Neil Goss, a student athlete covered by an 
ERISA plan, who sustained seriously injury in a sports accident. 34 Goss' s injuries resulted in 
medical bills of nearly $500,000, which his health plan paid. 35 Goss was sued by his health plan 
for a lien on any potential judgment or settlement obtained through a tort action.36 Because Goss 
lived in Illinois, his case was governed by Seventh Circuit precedent, and the lien was granted 
even before funds were recovered. 37 Had Goss lived in another jurisdiction the end result may 
have been different. The circuit splits are so varying and the explanations offered by the courts 
so intricate that a full examination is not possible in this article. However, a brief overview helps 
underline the murkiness of ERISA preempted subrogation litigation. 
The circuits have split on whether strict adherence to the terms of an ERISA plan that 
disclaims the application of traditional equitable defenses constitutes "appropriate equitable 
relief." Several circuits, and notably the Eleventh, Eighth, Seventh and Fifth Circuits, have 
stressed the primacy of an ERISA plan's express language, and have decided that in balancing 
the equities, simple contract interpretation that provides for full reimbursement per the plain 
terms of a plan that disclaims the application of traditional equitable defenses such as the make-
whole doctrine and the common fund doctrine, constitutes "appropriate equitable relief' under§ 
502(a)(3).38 In Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O'Hara, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the application of 
"federal common law to override the Plan's controlling language, which expressly provides for 
reimbursement regardless of whether [the beneficiary] was made whole by his third-party 
34 Primax Recoveries Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d at801. 
35 /d. 
36 /d. 
37 /d. 
38 Green v. Holland, 480 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007); Northcutt v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Employees 
Pension Plan, 467 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 2006); ACS Recovery Services, Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
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recovery, would frustrate, rather than effectuate, ERISA's 'repeatedly emphasized purpose to 
protect contractually defined benefits.' "39 
In Admin. Comm. ofWal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates' Health & Welfare Plan v. 
Shank, the Eight Circuit stated that "[n]othing in the statute suggests Congress intended that 
section 502(a)(3)'s limitation of the [plan's] recovery to "appropriate equitable relief' would 
upset these contractually-defined expectations [such as a make-whole rule disclaimer].40 Indeed, 
ERISA's mandate that ' [ e ]very employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained 
pursuant to a written instrument,' 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l), establishes the primacy of the written 
plan."41 
The Seventh Circuit, in Administrative Committee of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. ' 
Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, held that in an action under§ 502(a)(3), 
[l]t is inappropriate to fashion a common law rule that would override the express 
terms of a private plan unless the overridden plan provision conflicts with 
statutory provisions or other policies underlying ERISA .... Those cases which 
have applied the federal common fund doctrine in the favor of individual ERISA 
participants have done so, correctly, only in the absence of controlling plan 
language42 
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. 'Health and Welfare Plan v. Wells, the Seventh Circuit went on 
to suggest that in an action under§ 502(a)(3), the parties to an ERISA plan could, by contract, 
alter the "background of common-sense understandings and legal principles [such as the 
common fund doctrine] that ... operate as default rules to govern in the absence of a clear 
expression of the parties' intent that they not govem.',43 
39 Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O'Hara, 604 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2010) 
40 Admin. Comm. ofWal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates' Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 
839 (8th Cir. 2007). 
41 !d. 
42 Admin. Comm.ofWal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.' Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 691-
92 (7th Cir.2003). 
43 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.' Health and Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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In Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot and 
Wansbrough, the Fifth Circuit stated that "the Plan's terms not only give it the right to recover 
benefits ' to the extent of any and all' settlement payments, but explicitly state that the participant 
must bear the fees and costs associated with his tort action ... "44 The court even went so far as to 
state that" ... neither the federal nor Texas common fund doctrine may be invoked to prevent or 
reduce the Plan's recovery of the funds that it advanced to [the beneficiary] up to the full amount 
of his recovery from the tortfeasor."45 
The Supreme Court has handed down several decisions that shed light on the extent of a 
health plan administrators right of subrogation. A brief overview of these decisions is therefore 
appropriate. In FMC Corp. v Holliday,46 an action involving subrogation under a self-funded 
ERISA governed employee benefit plan, the Court held that a Pennsylvania statute providing 
that: in tort actions arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no subrogation or 
reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to benefits payable under any 
program, group contract, or other arrangement, was preempted by ERISA.47 Noting that ERISA 
supersedes all state laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan, the court observed 
that although the Pennsylvania statute fell within ERISA's saving clause permitting states to 
regulate insurance, an ERISA plan shall not be deemed an insurance company, an insurer, or 
engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of any state law purporting to regulate the 
insurance industry.48 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) exempts self funded ERISA plans from state 
44 Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot and Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 
348, 361 (5th Cir.2003). 
45 ld. 
46 FMC Corp. v. Holliday 498 US 52 (1990). 
47/d. 
48 /d. 
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laws regulating insurance.49 This rational has been applied by other courts to bar the application 
of a state's anti-subrogation statute to ERISA qualified plans. 5° 
The most important decision on the issue of subrogation rendered by the Supreme Court 
was Great-W Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson. 51 In Knudson, Janette Knudson was rendered 
a quadriplegic by a car accident occurring June 1992.52 Because her husband, Eric Knudson, was 
employed by Earth Systems, Inc., Janette was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for 
Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (Plan). 53 The Plan covered $411,157.11 of 
Janette's medical expenses, of which all except $75,000 was paid by petitioner Great-West Life 
& Annuity Insurance Co. pursuant to a "stop-loss" insurance agreement with the Plan. 54 The Plan 
included a subrogation provision which provided 
[T]he Plan shall have 'the right to recover from the [beneficiary] any payment for 
benefits' paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third 
party. Specifically, the Plan has 'a first lien upon any recovery, whether by 
settlement, judgment or otherwise,' that the beneficiary receives from the third 
party, not to exceed 'the amount of benefits paid [by the Plan] ... [or] the amount 
received by the [beneficiary] for such medical treatment. .. 55 
The Supreme Court held that the provision of ERISA authorizing plan participants and 
fiduciaries to bring civil actions to obtain "appropriate equitable relief' did not authorize the 
employee benefit plan to bring an action for specific performance of reimbursement provision of 
plan, and to compel a plan beneficiary who had recovered from alleged third-party tortfeasor to 
make restitution. 56 This holding relied on the court's reading of ERISA and its provision that the 
49 ld. 
50 Danowski by Dawnoski v United States, 924 F Supp 66l(D.N.J. 1996). 
51 Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,207, (2002). 
52 ld. 
53 ld. 
54 ld. 
55 ld. 
56 ld. 
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plan administrator could get only equitable relief. 57 Because specific performance did not exist at 
equity, the plan could not sue for specific performance. 58 "[A]n injunction to compel the 
payment of money past due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due monetary 
obligation, was not typically available in equity."59 
Unfortunately, Knudson did not resolve the subrogation issue. It simply eliminated a plan 
administrator's ability to sue for specific performance or other remedies not existing at equity. 60 
Plan administrators, however, can still sue to enforce the plans terms or for equitable relief. In 
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 61 the Court again considered an ERISA plan 
administrator's claim for reimbursement under the terms of the plan and§ 502(a)(3).62 This time 
the plan administrator was able to overcome the initial hurdle of identifying specific funds within 
the beneficiary's possession and control.63 Accordingly, the Court proceeded to consider whether 
there was a basis in equity for the administrator's reimbursement claim. 64 It held that the claim 
could be based on an equitable lien by agreement. 65 Such a lien is not subject to the asset tracing 
requirements imposed on liens sought as a matter of equitable restitution.66 Nor is it inherently 
subject to the particular equitable defenses that accompany a freestanding action for equitable 
subrogation, which may only be asserted after a victim has been made whole for his injuries. 67 
Thus, the Court held that the plan administrator in Sereboff properly sought "equitable relief' 
57 Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,207, (2002) .. 
58 !d. 
59 !d. at 210-11. 
60 !d. 
61 Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356 . 
62 !d. at 359. 
63 !d. at 362-63. 
64 See id. at 3 63-64. 
65 !d. at 364-65, (citing Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914)). 
66 Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356. 
67 !d. at 368. 
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under§ 502(a)(3).68 However, it expressly reserved decision on whether the term "appropriate," 
which modifies "equitable relief' in§ 502(a)(3), would make equitable principles and defenses 
applicable to a claim under that section. 69 
Therefore, the Court's holdings in Knudson and Sereboff, did not definitively solve the 
issue. The Knudson decision was specifically limited to the issue of specific performance and 
what remedies are available under ERISA. Particularly relevant in Knudson was the fact that the 
funds had been placed in trust and where not in the control of the insured. 70 While Knudson did 
not solve the issue, this decision is critical to the holding in McCutchen. 
III. Congressional Intent 
Congress passed ERISA in 197 4 with in order to address numerous deficiencies in 
insurance regulation and inconsistent state court decisions.71 In drafting ERISA, Congress's 
express goal was to protect: 
[P]articipants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring 
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and 
other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, 
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by 
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal 
courts.72 
This has made ERISA an extremely powerful piece of legislation as it has been held to preempt 
state legislation in most areas of employer provided health insurance regulation. 73 A review of 
the legislative history of ERISA, and particularly the enforcement provisions of§ 502, sheds 
light on how the issue of subrogation should be resolved. 
68 Jd. at 369. 
69 Jd. at 368 n. 2; McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 675. 
70Sereboff, 547 U.S. at357. 
71 29 U.S.C.§ 1132 ([date]) 
72 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,44 (1987). 
73 Holliday, 498 U.S. at 64; Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA states that a civil action may be brought "by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the 
plan." 74 The term "other appropriate equitable relief' has been interpreted to limit a health plan 
administrators rights those existing in equity.75 Therefore, when suing to collect funds obtained 
from a tort judgment or settlement following a sports injury, plan administrators exercise their 
equitable rights under this section. However, it is unclear if this subjects the plan administrator to 
equitable defenses. The legislative history reveals that equitable principles permeated the 
drafting of ERISA and Congress intended all equitable defenses to be available to plan 
beneficiaries. 
As the legislative history demonstrates, Congress was mindful of equitable considerations 
through the drafting of ERISA. In fact, the legislation was meant to strike "an appropriate and 
equitable balance between two opposing schools of thought-- those who advocate complete and 
stringent control of private pensions and those who oppose any form of government supervisory 
or regulatory control."76 Further, when creating rules for the distribution of plan funds after 
termination, Congress again applied equitable limitations to plan administrators: 
The Committee also has made provision for contributory plans to equitably 
distribute any surplus funds remaining on plan termination to the participants in 
accordance with their rate of contribution .... The Committee believes it is unfair 
to permit the complete recapture by employers of surplus funds in terminated 
contributory plans, without regard to the fact that contributions by the workers 
helped to generate the surplus . ... equitable principles require that this particular 
subject be governed by a specific rule which reflects what the Committee 
regards as essential protection for the interests of workers in such plans. 77 
74 29 U.S.C. § 1132 ([date]) 
75 McCutchen, 663 F.3d at675. 
76 S. Rep. No. 127, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4850 
77 /d. at4866 
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Considerations of equity permeated the legislative hearings surrounding the passage of ERISA, 
and this influenced the remedies Congress intended to create. 
Most importantly, the legislative history reveals that ERISA's enforcement 
provisions were "designed specifically to provide both the Secretary and participants and 
beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the 
Retirement Income Security for Employees Act as well as the amendments made to the 
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act."78 The Senate report expressly states the 
intent of Congress in creating these broad enforcement provisions: 
The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable 
remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional 
and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective 
enforcement of fiduciary res~onsibilities under state law or recovery of 
benefits due to participants. 7 
The Senate report makes it clear that these broad powers are intended for plan beneficiaries and 
not plan administrators. ERISA was meant to protect plan beneficiaries, not grant plan 
administrators additional rights or remedies outside of what existed at equity. Therefore, 
Congress used equitable principles to both expand the rights of beneficiaries and limit the powers 
of plan administrators. 
Congress passed ERISA because the prior existing law often left plan participants with 
only "traditional equitable remedies of the common law of trusts" when a dispute arose. 80 
Further, Congress found that "[ c ]ourts strictly interpret the plan indenture and are reluctant to 
apply concepts of equitable relief or to disregard technical document wording."81 One purpose of 
ERISA was to avoid inequitable results because of technical document wording and inequitable 
78 /d. at 4871. 
79 /d. 
80 /d. 
81 /d. at 4842. 
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agreements in health plans. For example, Congress adopted total retrospective vesting credit to 
ERISA governed plans "in the interests of complete equity ... and to promote simplicity in the 
understanding and application of the vesting requirements of the bill ... "82 A subrogation clause, 
which is often highly technical, rarely read by plan participants and almost always part of a 
contract of adhesion, is exactly what Congress sought to avoid through its inclusion of equity in 
Section 502. 
Plan administrators are therefore limited to equitable relief and this must mean only those 
remedies available at equity. 83 Given the importance that Congress gave equitable considerations 
when drafting ERISA, it should be inferred that Congress intended to include equitable defenses, 
such as unjust enrichment, when a beneficiary is defending against an administrator's right to 
subrogation under the complex terms of a health plan's language. 
IV. McCutchen's Analysis 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dramatically altered subrogation litigation for ERISA 
qualified plans when it concluded that "Congress intended to limit the equitable relief available 
under§ 502(a)(3) through the application of equitable defenses and principles that were 
typically available in equity" despite the negation of such defenses and principles in an ERISA 
plan.84 McCutchen, who participated in an ERISA-govemed employee welfare benefits plan, 
was injured in a car accident and the plan paid $66,866 in medical expenses on his 
behalf. 85 McCutchen recovered $110,000 from third parties, via an action in tort, and the plan, 
based on a subrogation clause in the plan requiring full reimbursement, sought to recover the full 
82 S. Rep. No. 127, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,4856 
83 McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 675. 
84 /d. at 676. 
85 /d. at 672. 
15 
$66,866 from McCutchen even though McCutchen's net recovery was less than that amount after 
paying a 40% contingency fee to his attorney. 86 
McCutchen argued that notwithstanding the plan terms, it was unfair to grant the plan full 
reimbursement because he was not fully compensated for his injuries and the plan did not 
contribute to attorneys' fees and costs. 87 The Third Circuit agreed, finding no indication in 
ERISA or in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence that Congress intended to limit relief under § 
502(a)(3) to ''traditional equitable categories" yet not limit relief"by other equitable doctrines 
and defenses that were traditionally applicable to those categories."88 In other words, if a plan 
administrator's right to subrogation comes from equity then those rights are subject to the 
limitations and defenses that existed in equity. 
The McCutchen court reasoned that an ERISA fund administrator seeking to enforce a plan's 
reimbursement provision must demonstrate that its claim to relief is equitable; "appropriate 
equitable relief' must be something less than all equitable relief, and may be limited through the 
application of equitable defenses and principles that are typically available in equity. 89 Therefore, 
a judgment requiring a plan participant to provide full reimbursement to a plan administrator for 
medical expenses which the administrator paid, constituted inappropriate and inequitable relief 
under ERISA, because the amount of the judgment exceeded the net amount of the participant's 
third-party recovery of damages arising from automobile accident. Therefore, it left him with 
less than full payment for his emergency medical bills, thus undermining the entire purpose of 
86 !d. at 673. 
87 !d. at 674. 
88 McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 676-79. 
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the plan, while at the same time, unjustly enriching administrator, which did not exercise its 
subrogation rights or contribute to the cost of obtaining the third-party recovery.90 
The impact of the McCutchen decision is still not clear as the Supreme Court recently 
granted certiorari.91 If the court's decision is upheld it would appear that many equitable 
considerations would be available to injured beneficiaries despite the plans subrogation terms. At 
the very least, plan administrators would see their recoveries reduced unless they participate in 
the recovery. The Third Circuit's instructions on remand offer further clarification of the effect 
its decision will have if it is upheld. On remand, the Third Circuit instructed the district court to: 
Engage in any additional fact-finding it finds necessary. In addition to the 
considerations discussed above, factors such as the distribution of the third-party 
recovery between McCutchen and his attorneys at Rosen Louik & Perry, the 
nature of their agreement, the work performed, and the allocation of costs and 
risks between the parties to this suit may inform the Court's exercise of its 
discretion to fashion "appropriate equitable relief. 92 
If the Supreme Court affirms McCutchen in its entirety, then plan administrators will be subject 
to defenses that will reduce their recovery to what is appropriate. Most likely this will force 
health plans to work with their insured members when they are seeking recovery from 
tortfeasors. Given that most health plans are large sophisticated entities, often with their own in-
house litigation teams, this could dramatically improve the quality of tort litigation in the future. 
Not only can health plans offer legal advice and counsel to their insured beneficiaries, but 
insured members could also rely upon the plan's knowledge of legal professionals and 
recommend qualified attorney's and even help pay some of the litigation costs. All of this would 
vastly improve the overall field of tort litigation and vastly improve plaintiffs rights. 
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V. Criticisms of McCutchen 
Several courts have offered criticisms of the holding in McCutchen. The strongest 
criticisms come from Schwade v. Total Plastics, Inc. 93 In Schwade the court was faced with a 
different scenario regarding subrogation litigation but offered a thorough criticism of the 
reasoning in McCutchen. Schwade involved a dispute over what health benefits where due under 
the terms of an ERISA qualified plan. 94 The insured beneficiary sued the health plan for 
health care benefits under the plan's terms. 95 The plan administrator argued that Schwade 
violated the plan by refusing to sign a subrogation agreement and was therefore not entitled to 
benefits.96 Schwade, in turn, argued that subrogation clauses were unfair and based on the 
intervening law in McCutchen, did not bar her suit.97 The court disagreed. 
Schwade makes two main criticisms, neither of which is well founded. First, it states that 
McCutchen announces a broad, judicially manufactured alteration of ERISA (certain to increase 
the cost to each participant in each plan) based on a little-explained reading of several narrow 
Supreme Court decisions.98 Second, McCutchen revises a plan over the objection of the plan's 
managers, contrary to the interests of other participants, and on behalf of a single beneficiary. 99 
The court goes on to argue that McCutchen agreed to subrogation in exchange for a guarantee 
that his medical bills would be immediately by his health plan. 100 As stated previously, neither of 
these criticisms is well founded. 
93 Schwade v. Total Plastics, Inc. 837 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
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First, McCutchen does not alter ERISA, it simply gives power to some of its language, 
particularly the provision allowing the plan administrator to sue for equitable relief. If anything 
the McCutchen Court applied the statute exactly as written. The McCutchen analysis is also in 
line with Supreme Court precedent. As the Court made clear in Knudson, a plan administrator 
can only get equitable relief. 101 It would be illogical and unjust to assume that the Court intended 
to grant the health plan equitable rights without subjecting them to equitable defenses. 
Second, upholding McCutchen will not increase the cost to the plan in any significant 
way. McCutchen did not eliminate the right of subrogation altogether. The plan will still be 
entitled to recovery. Its recovery will simply be reduced to what is equitable in light of the 
circumstances. 102 Therefore, plan administrators will be required to take a more active role in 
securing relief form tortfeasors and can no longer rely on their insured to undertake the expense 
of litigation. Furthermore, health plans do not count on their ability to recover via subrogation 
when determining health care premiums.103 In fact, subrogation has been found to play no role in 
rate schedules. 104 
When an insurer pays a loss, the insurer will simply pay an anticipated loss that has 
already been distributed over a pool of similarly-situated individuals. 105 This is accomplished by 
using actuarial and statistical data. 106 When the insurer sets the initial premium that the insured 
will pay he takes into account the insured's pro-rata share of the total estimated losses for the 
pool as well as the insured's shares of the insurers profit to be realized from that individual 
101 Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207 . 
102 See Third Circuits instructions on remand. [incorrect citation] 
103 Roger M. Baron & Delia M. Druley, ERISA Reimbursement Proceeds: Where Does the Money Go?, 
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insured. 107 Therefore, the insurer will never suffer an actual loss when he does not recover 
d ... . 1 1 . 108 payments rna e 10r any partlcu ar c atm. 
Therefore, there is no windfall to the insured but rather to the health plan when 
they are entitled to subrogation. 109 Not only does the health plan obtain a windfall from 
subrogation in recovering its medical expenses, but it also obtains a windfall in not 
having to contribute to the costs associated with the recovery. McCutchen simply applied 
the well know axiom that "equity abhors a windfal1."110 
Upholding McCutchen will be beneficial in several ways. First, health plans are 
sophisticated entities with access to superior counsel. Often larger health plans can retain counsel 
at a discounted hourly rate. This will substantially increase a plaintiffs access to more 
experienced counsel at larger firms and would greatly level the playing field in tort litigation as 
defendants are often represented by large insurers that can better afford legal counsel. Second, 
health plans can better afford the costs associated with a lawsuit. Third, health plans have better 
access to medical professional who can be relied upon as experts in the tort litigation. Since most 
health plans use an HMO type system111 to retain medical professionals, wherein they are paid a 
regular monthly fee to see the health plans patients112, these fee agreements can be used to 
require medical professionals to act as experts in tort litigation on behalf of the plan 
administrator. This would dramatically reduce the cost of litigation as expert's fees are amongst 
the most costly expenses in tort litigation. 
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Another decision criticizing McCutchen, is Iron Workers Locals 40, 361 & 417 Health 
Fund v. Dinnigan, 113 an unpublished case from the Southern District of New York. In Locals 40, 
a union member's daughter was injured in an automobile accident, treatment for which was paid 
by his employer provided health plan. 114 Following a tort settlement, the health plan sued for 
subrogation. The court rejected the beneficiaries argument that it would be unjust enrichment for 
the health plan to be reimbursed from the settlement as it did not participate in the recovery. 115 
The court rejected McCutchen stating: 
The Court has already determined that it is not unjust enrichment for Plaintiff 
to seek reimbursement for the health care expenses it incurred on behalf of the 
Dinnigans. Indeed, Plaintiff owes that much to other plan beneficiaries. But 
acknowledging Plaintiffs right to proceed does not mean that Plaintiff is 
entitled to a free ride. In seeking equity, Plaintiff must be prepared to do 
equity. 116 
The Souther District of New York also misread the decision in McCutchen. As the Third 
Circuit's instructions on McCutchen's remand make clear, the health plan is still entitled to a 
recovery; its recovery is simply reduced by the cost undertaken by the beneficiary to secure the 
judgment or settlement. 117 Further, the plan beneficiary in Locals 40, already paid a higher 
premium than they otherwise would have, as the health plan took into account the cost of tort 
injuries when setting premiums in the first place. 118 Lastly, the court's statement that the plan 
beneficiaries owed subrogation to the other beneficiaries shows just how little the court 
understands about how most health plan operate. 119 Other beneficiaries will not see any reduction 
in premiums or any increase in benefits as a result of the plans recovery via subrogation. Rather, 
113 Iron Workers Locals 40,361 & 417 Health Fund v. Dinnigan, 12 CIV. 2566 PAC, 2012 WL 5877426 
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the recovery will simply go to pay overhead expenses of the plan or bonuses to plan 
d . . 120 a m1n1strators. 
Therefore, a health plan can participate in tort litigation and even improve the quality of 
the plaintiffs counsel and experts at minimal costs. This will likely result in increased tort 
judgments against tortfeasors and higher recoveries for both the insured and the plan. The entire 
field of tort litigation would be improved by this change. 
VI. Conclusion 
With the Supreme Court granting certiorari in McCutchen, 121 the Court as the opportunity 
to dramatically alter, and improve, the entire field of tort litigation. If the Supreme Court upholds 
McCutchen, plaintiffs suffering from sports injuries will no longer be hamstringed in their 
efforts to bring cases to trial or settlement as the looming specter of a subrogation lien will be 
less of a dispositive factor. Further, plan administrators will be presented with the opportunity to 
take a more active role in litigating these cases on behalf of their insureds, instead of sitting on 
the sidelines, avoiding contributing to the costs of the litigation, waiting to assert a lien on any 
judgment or settlement. As plan administrators are often sophisticated entities who, by nature of 
the volume of legal work they produce, can retained experienced counsel at discounted rates, 
they can provide their members with access to counsel for mutual benefit. 
Contrary to arguments that have been presented, upholding McCutchen will not increase 
the costs to plan administrators or to members. Health plans use actuarial data to determine the 
amount of claims that they will need to pay out over a specified group of members. 122 This data 
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takes into account the amount of money the plan will need to spend when a member is injured in 
a tort, such as a sports injury. 123 Each group pays a premium that reflects the anticipated costs to 
the health plan. 124 When a health plan recovers additional funds via subrogation, members are 
not refunded any portion of their premium.125 Instead, this windfall goes to cover administrative 
expenses or is rolled over to cover expenses in the next year. 126 Therefore, eliminating 
subrogation, or limiting a plan administrator's share in tort judgments or settlements to his 
contributions in the recovery, would not increase costs or harm the plan administrator in any 
way. 
Additionally, applying equitable principals to subrogation rights is consistent with the 
Congressional intent underlying ERISA. 127 As most state laws already limit a health plan 
administrators subrogation rights 128, ERISA has become the primary means by which plan 
administrators will attempt to assert subrogation rights. Because ERISA preempts health plans 
that are provided by an employer129, and most health plans are employer provided, ERISA is a 
major obstacle to a plaintiff seeking to avoid subrogation. As Congress never intended ERISA to 
become the primary tool for plan administrators to avoid equity in subrogation cases, McCutchen 
should be upheld. ERISA was not meant to protect plan administrators but rather offer greater 
protections to insured members. 
Subrogation looms in the back of any tort case. In many circuits, plan administrators can 
sit on the sidelines, waiting for injured beneficiaries to undertake the significant expense of 
litigating a tort injury, then swoop in and demand subrogation, without ever contributing to the 
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settlement or judgment. This practice is inequitable. Today with players suing the N.F.L 130 and 
N.C.A.A131 for sports injuries and numerous high schools facing liability for concussions132, the 
amount of money at stake is immense. Only the Third Circuit has found a compromise that 
would reward plan administrators for contributing to tort judgments and settlements. This 
compromise would improve the entire field of tort litigation and bring harmony between the 
interests of plan administrators and their beneficiaries .. As plan administrators seek to squeeze 
every dollar they can out of their beneficiaries, it becoming increasingly clear that court must 
decide between equity, on the one hand, and subrogation on the other. Equity should be the 
primary concern of our courts, not subrogation. 
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